Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves? by Nikiforakis, Nikos
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper Series  
 
 
2004 – 05 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
Royal Holloway College 
University of London 
Egham TW20 0EX 
 
 
 
 
 
©2004 Nikos Nikiforakis. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, 
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © 
notice, is given to the source. 
 
Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public 
Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves? * 
 
 
Nikos S. Nikiforakis 
Royal Holloway University of London 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Recent public goods experiments have shown that free riding can be 
curtailed through mutual monitoring and sanctioning between members of a 
group. However, often we can not allow for punishment and exclude the 
possibility of counter-punishment occurring. We design a public goods 
experiment, where we allow for both punishment and counter-punishment. 
We find that in both partner and stranger treatments cooperation declines 
over time. The reason is that people are less willing to punish under the 
threat of counter-punishment. Participants squander their endowment in 
costly confrontations leading to a relative payoff loss, in comparison to a 
treatment without punishments. 
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1. Introduction 
Contrary to the predictions of standard economic theory that people will not 
contribute voluntarily for the production of a public good, a considerable 
amount of experiments have shown that, initially, people give on average 
between 40 and 60 percent of their endowment. However, the contribution 
level decreases with repetition under the influence of free-riders [Davis and 
Holt (1993), Ledyard (1995), Fehr and Fischbacher (2003)]. This leads to 
the under provision of public goods. 
In an attempt to deal with this problem, Fehr and Gaechter (2000) 
(hereafter F&G) designed an experiment, where participants played a two-
stage public goods game. In the first stage, they were asked to divide their 
endowment between a public and a private account. The returns from each 
account were designed so that group earnings were maximized when 
participants contributed all their money in the public account. However, 
each individual had an incentive to keep his endowment for himself.  
In the second stage, participants were allowed to assign punishment 
points to the other members in their group after they were notified about 
individual contributions in the public account. Punishment was costly for 
both the punisher and its receiver. The ability to punish non-cooperators led 
to significantly higher contributions in comparison to a treatment, where 
sanction opportunities did not exist.  
The design of F&G has become a standard and a considerable 
number of more recent studies have used it since to address further issues in 
public goods literature [Bowles and Gintis (2002), Page and Putterman 
(2000), Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2002), Carpenter (2002), Masclet, 
Noussair, Tucker, Villeval (2003)]. 
In every day life, however, there exists an abundance of evidence 
that people are willing to engage in costly counter-punishment, such as the 
infamous vendettas in Italy and the recently revived honour-related blood 
feuds in Albania. At the same time, one can observe many cases of free-
riding coupled with the cooperators’ unwillingness to punish. An example of 
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the latter is the reluctance to punish countries that refused to sign the Kyoto 
Protocol for the reduction of the emissions of greenhouse gasses in the 
atmosphere1.  
In the light of this, we wish to test whether the threat of counter-
punishment can be an explanation in cases where free-riding is observed. To 
do this we designed a public goods experiment with two treatments: one 
without any form of punishment, the familiar voluntary contribution 
mechanism (VCM), and one with punishment and counter-punishment 
(P&CP). The two treatments were run under both the partner and the 
stranger protocol.  
In the VCM treatment, as we will see, average contribution exhibited 
a similar behaviour to the one reported in other experiments, by starting 
between 40 and 60 percent of the endowment and decreasing over time. The 
introduction of counter-punishment opportunities in the P&CP treatment 
seems to cancel out, to a large extent, punishment’s reported disciplinary 
effect and participants behave similarly to the VCM treatment with average 
contribution declining with repetition. In the words of Girard (1979): 
“Reciprocal violence now demolishes everything that unanimous violence 
has erected”. We show that an explanation for this is that under the counter-
threat, people are less willing to punish and as a result, participants are 
almost free to free ride.  
To our knowledge, there is no other paper testing for the effect that 
the existence of counter-punishment opportunities has on the level of 
cooperation. Although in our experiment no explicit coordination 
opportunities exist, in the partner treatment, the fact that the composition of 
                                                 
1 Air is a textbook case of a pure public good. 
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the groups remains the same might lead to the formation of behavioural 
norms that will alleviate free-riding more effectively2.  
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 
introduces the experimental design and the procedures of the experiment, 
while section 3 presents the theoretical predictions for our model. Section 4 
discusses the experimental results and section 5 concludes.  
 
 2. The Experiment  
2.1 The experimental design:  
To have a clear picture of the effect that counter-punishment has on 
cooperation we based our design on F&G. In general, we will refer to the 
type of punishment, like  the one found in F&G, as “one-sided punishment”, 
in contrast to the “two-sided punishment” when counter-punishment is 
allowed.  
Using a related sample design, the experiment consists of two 
treatments: one without any punishment (VCM), and one with two-sided 
punishment i.e. with punishment and counter-punishment (P&CP). We run 
the treatments both under the partner protocol, where the composition of 
each group remains unchanged throughout the experiment and under the 
stranger protocol, where the participants where randomly re-matched in 
each period. For each treatment there were 12 subjects who were randomly 
divided in groups of 4 people and played a finitely repeated public goods 
game for 10 periods.  
All participants were aware that each treatment would last exactly 10 
periods. However, they were not aware that a second treatment was to 
                                                 
2 Masclet et al. (2003) show that when the same group of people play a finitely repeated 
public goods game the expression of disapproval towards anti-social behavior can also play 
a significant role in decreasing free-riding.  
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follow3. The related sample design, i.e. each subject participates in both 
treatments, has the advantage that additionally to across-subjects 
comparison we can make within-subjects comparisons of the average level 
of contribution, which have much more statistical power. To test for 
sequence effects, in session 1 (stranger) and session 4 (partner) the 
participants played the P&CP treatment first and the VCM second, whereas 
in sessions 2, 3 (stranger) and 5 (partner) the order was reversed.  All this 
are summarised in table 1. In addition, we run two control sessions, one 
under each protocol, using one-sided punishment.  
Table 1: Treatment Conditions 
P&CP / VCM VCM / P&CP
Stranger
Session 1:         
3 groups of 4 
participants
Session 2 & 3:    
3 groups of 4 
participants
Partner
Session 4:         
3 groups of 4 
participants
Session 5:         
3 groups of 4 
participants
 
 
2.1.1 The VCM treatment: 
The first treatment is the standard voluntary contribution mechanism as 
presented first by Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984) and served as a control 
for the P&CP treatment. In the beginning of each of the ten periods, every 
participant received a fixed amount of 20 Experimental Currency Units 
(ECUs)4. The participant had then to decide how many ECUs to keep for 
himself and how many to invest into a project. All the participants made 
their decision simultaneously and without being aware of the others’ 
decisions. The monetary payoff for each subject in each period was given 
by:  
                                                 
3 This was done following the example of F&G, to keep the results from the first treatment 
unaffected by the existence of a second treatment.   
4 The ECU was exchanged at a rate of: 1 ECU = 4 p.  
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(1)   ∑
=
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VCM
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,*4.020π     
where 20 is the endowment in ECUs, ig  is the amount of ECUs subject i 
invests in the project (0≤ ig ≤20) and 0.4 is the marginal return per capita 
(MRPC) from the project. The payoff function implies that each player’s 
income comes from two sources: the money he keeps for himself, as 
indicated by ig−20 and a fraction of the total amount that the group 
invested in the project, ∑
=
n
j
jg
1
*4.0 .  
Equation (1) also suggests that full free-riding ( ig =0) is a dominant 
strategy in the stage game. This follows from ∂ VCMiπ /∂ ig =-1+0.4<0, which 
means that the more an individual contributes to the project the less her 
income will be in that stage. However, the aggregate payoff, ∑
=
4
1i
VCM
iπ is 
maximized if each group member fully cooperates ( ig =y), since 
∂∑
=
4
1i
VCM
iπ /∂ ig =-1+4*0.4>0.  
In the first treatment, the payoff function (1), the amount of the 
endowment, the MRPC, the number of the subjects and the duration of the 
treatment were all common knowledge between the players. The total payoff 
from the VCM treatment is equal to the sum of the 10 period payoffs as 
given by (1) i.e. ∑
=
10
1n
VCM
iπ .  
 
2.1.2 The P&CP treatment: 
In the second treatment, two more stages were added to the simple voluntary 
contribution mechanism, which now became the first of three stages. In the 
second stage subjects were given the opportunity to simultaneously punish 
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each other after being informed of the individual contributions5. To do so, 
group member i had to assign punishment points to group member j. This 
had two different effects in the payoffs of members i and j: for each point 
received by player j his income from the first stage, 1iπ , was reduced by 
10%. Note that the first stage income could never be reduced below zero, so 
if player j received more than 10 punishment points her income was reduced 
by 100%. Additionally, player i also faced a cost for distributing punishment 
points to player j. This cost was given by the following convex cost 
function, )( jiji pc≠ : 
Table 2: Punishment points per player and associated costs for the punishing subject 
 jip  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
)( jiji pc≠ 0 1 2 4 6 7 12 16 20 25 30 
 
Given the above information, the payoff at the end of the second stage for 
subject i is equal to:   
(2)   ∑∑
≠
≠ −





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 −
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10
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*12 ππ   
Up to the end of the second stage, the experiment is identical to the 
one by F&G. In the third and final stage, the subjects were informed about 
how many points each of the other members in their groups assigned to 
them. They were then given a last opportunity to reduce the income of the 
participants who punished them during the second stage by buying counter-
points6. To avoid strategic punishing, which would be inappropriate to study 
                                                 
5 For the whole experiment we used neutral framing. Punishment was referred to as 
“assigning points” in order to “reduce” another participant’s income. The public good itself 
was named “project”.  
6 The cost of the counter-points was equal to the cost of points, i.e. )( jicpc = )(
j
ipc . 
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the effect of counter-punishment, only the subjects who were punished were 
allowed to punish back7.  
The cost for assigning points works accumulatively i.e. if player i 
punished player j with 2 points during the second stage and then with 2 
further (counter-) points in the third stage, his total cost from points would 
be equal to 6 i.e. the cost of 4 points. The end-of-period income is given by  
the following equation: 
 (3)     )()(
10
)10,0max(
*23 ij
jiji
j
i
i
j
ij
i
j
pccppc
cp
∑∑∑
≠≠
≠ ++−
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





 −
= ιι ππ  
where jicp  is the number of counter-points that player i assigns to player j. 
The payoff functions (2) and (3), the cost function ( )( jiji pc≠ ), the 
amount of the endowment, the MRPC, the number of the subjects and the 
duration of the treatment were all common knowledge.  
To prevent the possibility of forming an individual reputation, in the 
beginning of each period, every player received a number between 1 and 4 
to distinguish their actions from the others’ within a period. This number, 
however, changed from period to period.    
Due to the restriction we impose on punishment, our design is 
expected to be a better predictor in cases where the punishment of non-
punishers is not possible, relevant or significant. Amongst others, such cases 
can include social exclusions, where individuals cannot observe each other’s 
sanctions, blood feuds and one-off interactions.   
  
2.2. Procedures 
The experiment took part between December 2003 and March 2004 in the 
experimental laboratory of Royal Holloway, University of London. It 
                                                 
7 By strategic punishment here we mean the preference of a subject to punish in the last 
stage, to avoid counter-punishment, instead of the second stage. 
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consisted of five sessions (2 partner, 3 stranger and 2 control8), which lasted 
approximately an hour and forty-five minutes9. The participants were 
recruited via e-mail. The total number of subjects was 84. The sample 
consisted of students with different nationalities and backgrounds including 
Economics10.  
At the beginning of each of the treatments, the participants were 
given a different set of instructions explaining in detail what was to 
happen11. They were then given as much time as they needed to read the 
instructions and to fill in a brief control questionnaire. In addition they were 
read a summary from a pre-written text. A trial period was used, where the 
participants were introduced to the computer screens they would have to use 
to make their decisions. Again, for this purpose, a pre-written text was used, 
to ascertain, as before, that all subjects would receive the same explanations 
regardless of the session they participated. The experiment was programmed 
and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher [1999]). Participants 
earned on average £17.90. No show up fee was given.  
 
 
3. Theoretical Predictions 
The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium prediction in all treatments is that 
participants should contribute nothing to the project, i.e. ig =0, for every i. In 
specific, in the VCM treatment the dominant strategy is to free ride. Using 
backward induction for the ten periods we find that the dominant strategy is 
to contribute nothing in the project.  
                                                 
8 Controls were used to test for differences in behaviour across countries based on cultural 
characteristics (Burlando and Hey [1997]). 
9 The control treatment lasted slightly less.  
10 Contrary to other findings (Marwell and Ames [1981]) the economists-to-be were arguably 
the strongest supporters of cooperation. 
11 The instructions for stages one and two were adopted from F&G. Instructions are available 
from the author upon request.  
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In the P&CP treatment, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium 
prediction is that people will neither punish nor counter-punish since this is 
costly and yields no material benefits. At the first stage, the participants 
understand that no one is going to punish them no matter whether they 
cooperate or not, and therefore they have no reason to contribute to the 
project, thus choosing to contribute zero. Applying backward induction for 
the ten periods we arrive at the prediction that ig =0, 
j
ip =0 and 
j
icp =0.  
As we saw earlier, experimental findings contradict these 
predictions. People are willing to contribute substantial fractions of their 
endowments in public accounts and to engage in costly confrontations. This 
is the first paper looking at people’s behaviour in the presence of counter-
punishment. 
     
4. Experimental Results 
We will begin by analyzing the effect of counter-punishment under 
the stranger protocol and then continue with the partner protocol. In the 
stranger condition, a 25% of the 136 sanctions were answered back12. Out of 
them, 55.3% were answered back with as many counter-points as the 
punishment points received. A 13.1% of them were answered back with 
even more points than those received.  
 
4.1 The impact of counter-punishment under the stranger protocol 
If the introduction of counter-punishment is of no importance, then we 
should observe no difference in the behaviour of the participants in 
comparison to other experiments that studied one-sided punishment. This 
means that in the P&CP treatment average contribution should increase in 
comparison to the VCM treatment and continue to do so under the threat of 
punishment. However, there is a significant difference between this 
behaviour and the one observed when counter-punishment was possible. 
 
                                                 
12 The maximum number of sanctions possible was: 1080. 
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Result 1: The simultaneous introduction of punishment and counter-
punishment causes only a minor aggregate increase in the average 
contribution level, which is considerably smaller than the one caused by 
one-sided punishment. 
 
Support for the first result comes from table 3. On the upper part of table 3, 
comparison of columns 2 and 3 shows that in sessions 1 and 3 we had an 
increase on the average contribution level, whereas in session 2 (when the 
VCM was played first) counter-punishment led to a decrease13. To have a 
basis for comparison, next to the results of our treatment with one-sided 
punishment, we present the aggregate results from F&G, as well as the ones 
from their third session, which was identical to our control14.  
The first thing that one should notice is the striking similarity of the 
results in the VCM treatment between the two experiments (3.59-3.7).  On 
average, the contribution level increases from 3.59 to 3.77, that is by 5%, 
which is substantially different from the 211% increase that the introduction 
of one-sided punishment caused in F&G or even the 51% in our control 
session. Additionally, one has to notice, in the last rows, the similarity of 
average contribution between the two samples in the one-sided punishment 
treatment across all periods (10.4-10.7). However, whereas in F&G average 
                                                 
13 It has been shown that the outcome of a public goods game is largely dependent on the 
mixture of selfish and altruistic individuals, and the environment in which the game is 
played (Fehr and Fischbacher [2003]). In session 2, four participants could be characterized 
as “perfect free riders” as they contributed zero in all periods. These subjects were able to 
drag down cooperation very quickly.  
14 Fehr and Gaechter also had three independent observations, each with 24 subjects. 
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) have shown that there is no difference in the results when 
using 12 or 24 subjects. 
 11
contribution was higher in the final period, in our case, there was an end-of-
treatment effect15.  
 
Table 3: Mean contributions in the stranger-
treatment 
  mean contribution in all periods  
mean contribution in the 
final periods 
Session VCM P&CP VCM P&CP 
1 3.97 6.80 2.17 3.83 
 (1.66) (1.71) (2.69) (3.13) 
2 3.55 2.47 0.58 0.92 
  (3.23) (1.86) (1.44) (1.51) 
3 3.24 5.83 2.58 4.50 
 (1.2) (0.93) (5.74) (3.94) 
     
mean 3.59 3.77 1.78 3.08 
  (1.85) (1.41) (3.75) (3.34) 
 VCM Punishment VCM Punishment 
FG mean 3.7 11.5  1.9 12. 
 (5.7)  (5.9)  (4.1)  (5.6)  
FG session 3 4.5 10.7 2.0 13.1 
 (6.0) (4.9) (3.8) (4.0) 
NSN control 6.9 10.4 2.83 9.25 
 (2.29) (1.14) (4.20) (5.83) 
Note: The numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations. In session one 
the treatment with P&CP was played first and then the VCM whereas in sessions 
two and three the roles were reversed. NSN refers to the author’s initials. 
 
These findings support our hypothesis that counter-punishment 
would eliminate, to a large extent, punishment’s positive effect on 
cooperation. 
Our next result deals with the evolution of average contribution over 
time. 
 
Result 2: Average contribution exhibits a similar behaviour in the VCM and 
the P&CP treatments, by staying at very low levels and declining over time. 
 
A first indication for result 2 can be found in table 3 by comparing columns 
2 to 3, and 4 to 5: we can see that there is only a small difference between 
                                                 
15 The evolution of average contribution in the control treatment can be seen in figure 8 in the 
appendix. 
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the two treatments. By focuing at columns 3 and 5, we observe the decline 
in average contribution with repetition.  
Figure 1, illustrates result 2 better and shows how strong the effect of 
counter-punishment is on the one of punishment in the stranger-treatment. In 
experiments with one-sided punishment, average contribution was 
increasing over time or at least was non-decreasing. The same behaviour 
arose in our control treatment. However, when counter-punishment is 
possible, average contribution is decreasing in both treatments and is very 
similar. This suggests that in the stranger-treatment counter-punishment 
balances off the punishment effect to a great extent.     
  
Figure 1: Average contribution over time in the stranger-
treatment (session 1, 2 and 3) 
 
Results 1 and 2 deal only with average contribution. To have a 
deeper understanding we take a look at the behavioural regularities at the 
individual level. Result 3 summarizes the findings. 
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Result 3: There is very similar behaviour in the final period of both 
treatments and free riding emerges as the modal action. 
 
The aforementioned result comes from figure 2. Although there appears to 
be a greater variation in the final period in the P&CP treatment, complete 
free-riding arises as the modal action and there is a total absence of  
participants who contributed more than 10 ECUs. This is in total antithesis 
of full cooperation being the mode in experiments with one-sided 
punishment. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of contributions in the final period 
of the stranger-treatment. 
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4.2 The impact of counter-punishment in the partner-treatment 
Under the partner protocol, there were 91 sanctions, 30% of which were 
answered back16. Of the latter, 40.7% counter-punished with more points 
than originally received and 44.4% with just as many.  
                                                 
16 The maximum number of sanctions possible was: 720. 
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The first result in the partner-treatment deals with the average 
contribution over all periods.  
 
Result 4: The introduction of punishment and counter-punishment 
opportunities causes a rise in the average contribution level.  
 
Table 4: Mean contributions in the partner-treatment 
 mean contribution in all periods 
mean contribution in the 
final periods 
Group VCM P&CP VCM P&CP 
1 4.45 13.03 0 10 
 (2.55) (1.44) (0) (3.56) 
2 0.73 2.33 0.25 0 
 (1.51) (3.09) (0.5) (0) 
3 1.58 7.73 0.25 0.5 
 (3.20) (6.30) (0.5) (0.58) 
4 3.7 7.15 0 3.25 
 (3.90) (2.84) (0) (3.95) 
5 2.95 7 0 5 
 (3.24) (1.07) (0) (5.77) 
6 7.85 13 0 0.25 
 (5.52) (5.68) (0) (0.5) 
     
Mean 3.54 8.37 0.07 2.71 
 (4.1) (5.32) (0.28) (4.61) 
 VCM Punishment VCM Punishment 
FG mean 7.5 17  3.2 18.2 
 (6.8)  (4.5)  (4.4)  (2.3)  
FG session 5 7.59 17.58 2.57 18.33 
 (6.8) (4.67) (4.79) (5.35) 
NSN Control 6.35 14.78 3 12.5 
 (2.71) (2.15) (6.16) (8.27) 
Note: The numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations. In session four (groups 
1, 2, 3) the treatment with P&CP was played first and then the VCM whereas in 
session five (groups 4, 5, 6) the roles were reversed. NSN refers to the authors initials. 
 
 
Evidence for result 4 can be found in table 4. By comparing column 2 with 
column 3 we notice that contribution has increased on average in all the 
groups. According to a Wilcoxon matched pairs test, with group averages as 
observations, this difference is statistically significant (p=0.028, two-tailed). 
On average, subjects contribute from 1.7 (group 6) to 4.9 (group 3) times 
more than in the no-punishment condition. In the P&CP condition, 
participants contribute on average 42 percent of their endowment. The 
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increase in contribution, in comparison to the VCM treatment (136%), is 
similar in amount to the one found by F&G, although the aggregate levels in 
both conditions seem to be half in our case.     
On the lower part of the table we can see that in both F&G and in 
our control, which is identical to session 5 of F&G, the introduction of one-
sided punishment rises contribution on average17 
If we compare column 2 with column 4 and column 3 with column 5 
we find again that in both treatments and for all 6 groups there has been a 
decline on the average level of contribution. In the final period of the P&CP, 
participants contribute on average only 2.71 ECUs. This can be summarized 
by result 5. 
 
Result 5: Both in the VCM and the P&CP conditions of the Partner-
treatment average contributions decreased sharply over time. 
 
Result 5 is better illustrated by figure 3, which once again shows that 
counter-punishment draws away most of the power that punishment had to 
discipline free riders. In both sessions, the average contribution to the public 
good in the P&CP treatment initially is roughly 12 ECUs and then follows a 
similar negative trend until it settles at approximately 3.5 ECUs. The VCM 
treatment has the same characteristics as in most reported experiments. 
People are conditionally cooperative and begin by contributing a significant 
fraction of their endowment which varies between 40 percent (session 1) to 
60 percent (session 2). However, soon the free-riders drug the cooperation in 
both cases down until it reaches almost complete free riding. 
The rate at which average contribution declines in figure 3 is similar 
for the two treatments. In the P&CP treatment there is on average a higher 
                                                 
17 Although this is true for all 3 groups in our control, cooperation in group 3 remained at low 
levels. The explanation is the same as the one given in footnote 13. There was also an end-of 
treatment effect. All these can be found  in the appendix. 
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level of contribution, which was less obvious in the stranger-treatment and 
might be attributed to the willingness to avoid disapproval (Masclet et 
al.[2003]) or at the repeated interaction between the participants (Fehr and 
Fischbacher [2003]) . Still in both cases, the subjects start contributing less 
as they become more experienced and cooperation falls at very low levels. 
 
Figure 3: Average contribution over time in the partner-
treatment (session 4 & 5) 
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  Our last result concerning the partner-treatment has again to do 
with the behavior at the individual level in the final period.  
 
Result 6: In both treatments, free-riding emerges as the modal action. 
 
Evidence for result 6 is drawn from the histogram in figure 4, which shows 
the relative frequency of contributions in the final period. As we can see, for 
both treatments zero contribution is the mode. In the P&CP condition, 54 
percent of the participants choose to free-ride completely and 13 percent 
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more to contribute just one ECU18. There are some individuals with higher 
contributions. In the VCM treatment, 92 percent decide to free-ride 
completely and the remaining 8 percent contribute one ECU. 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of contributions in the final 
periods of the partner-treatment. 
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4.3 Willingness to punish 
So far we have shown that the introduction of counter-punishment 
opportunities has a drastic effect to the level and the evolution of average 
contribution if compared to treatments employing one-sided punishment. 
The initial contributions in F&G are very similar to ours, however, as the 
experiments proceed the results diverge: in F&G, as well as in other 
experiments with one-sided punishment, average contribution increases with 
repetition, whereas in our experiment, average contribution decreases and 
tends towards full free riding. The question that arises therefore is what 
triggers this different behaviour?  
                                                 
18 This is a vast departure from the 82.5 percent of participants who chose to cooperate 
completely in F&G when counter-punishment was absent. 
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Punishment is a second order public good, since everyone benefits 
from its existence, but every individual would rather avoid its cost. The 
possibility of counter-punishment and the uncertainty of its harshness make 
punishment more costly and people less willing to punish. If this is the case 
indeed, we should observe a decline in the number of sanctions, which 
would then explain the existence of free riding. 
 To have a basis for comparison, we will juxtapose the evolution of 
the average number of sanctions from this experiment and the one of F&G. 
Our findings are summarized by result 7. 
 
Result 7: Even though average contribution declines, the average number 
of sanctions decreases significantly in both the partner and the stranger-
treatment when we allow for counter-punishment.  
 
Evidence for Result 7 is drawn from figures 5 and 6, which depict the 
evolution of the average number of sanctions over time. As we can see in 
figure 5, in the stranger-treatment of F&G there is a decline in the average 
number of sanctions over time reflecting mainly the increase on the level of 
contribution. The average number settles at approximately 0.6519. This 
implies that the participants, having realized the effectiveness of 
punishment, try to push the last non-cooperators to contribute more until the 
last moment.  
                                                 
19 An average of “0.25” implies that on average there was one sanction per group. An 
average of “1” implies that on average there were 4 sanctions per group i.e. one per player. 
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Figure 5: Evolution of the average number of punishments 
sanctions in the stranger-treatment 
 
In our experiment, the average number of sanctions starts and 
remains at a lower level, while it pursues a similar course, which should 
now be attributed to the realization that the threat of punishment can not 
alleviate free-riding and also that punishment can be punished.  
In the partner-treatment depicted in figure 6, after the second period, 
the average number of sanctions in F&G falls sharply following the increase 
in the subjects’ cooperation levels and continues to do so with minor 
increases until it is finally stabilized around 0.6. In our experiment, the 
average number of sanctions in the partner-treatment is not downward 
sloping and it moves at much lower levels. Between periods 3 and 5 there 
appears to be an effort from the cooperators side to discipline the free riders 
in order to stop declining contribution. However, after period 5 there is a 
decline on the average number of punishments possibly reflecting the 
“surrender” of the cooperators and the average settles at very low levels 
(less than one punishment action per group). The difference of the average 
number of sanctions across treatments is statistically significant under both 
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protocols according to a Mann-Whitney U test with the average number of 
sanctions per group as observations20. 
 
Figure 6: Evolution of the average number of punishments 
sanctions in the partner-treatment 
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  Result 7 becomes even more remarkable when we take in 
consideration  
the fact that in our experiment, where average contribution was at a much 
lower level, participants had a more serious reason to want to punish. On the 
other hand, in the experiment by F&G, average contribution was constantly 
increasing approaching full cooperation eliminating the reasons for 
punishment. These findings lend support to the hypothesis that counter-
punishment makes people less willing to punish 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 The accuracy of these results is supported by our findings in the control treatment. 
Figures 10 and 11 in the appendix compare our control treatments with their F&G 
equivalent. The difference is not significant. 
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4.4 Effectiveness of punishment 
The effect that counter-punishment has on the willingness to punish is not 
the only one: counter-punishment appears to diminish the effectiveness of 
punishment.  
In F&G, 89 (78) percent of the participants increased their 
contribution in the partner (stranger) treatment, after they were punished. 
The average increase was 4.6 ECUs (3.8 ECUs). In this experiment only 30 
(29) percent increased their contribution level by an average of 3.6 ECUs (4 
ECUs), following a punishment. So why are people less responsive to 
punishment? 
  First, we have to see whether the actual size of the punishments is 
now different i.e. do people punish more lightly in order to avoid 
retribution? In the partner-treatment of F&G, the weighted average size of 
punishment was 1.71, whereas in this experiment it was equal to 2.20. So, if 
anything, participants punished even more on average when counter-
punishment was present. The answer, therefore, to the previous question can 
not be found here.  
The situation is reversed in the stranger-treatment, where the 
weighted average size of punishment in F&G was 1.90, in contrast to the 
1.47 of our experiment.  In this case, therefore, part of the observed lack of 
reaction to punishment might be attributed to the lower average size of 
punishment. 
The decreased responsiveness to punishment might seem surprising, 
since even people who did not counter-punish were reluctant to increase 
their contribution. An explanation might be that participants, observing the 
modest willingness of cooperators to punish free riders, pre-emptied the 
decay of cooperation and chose not to raise their contribution when they 
themselves were punished. 
 
Result 8: In the presence of counter-punishment, people react less to 
punishment.  
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4.5 Payoff Consequences of Two-Sided Punishment 
We saw earlier that the Nash equilibrium in the voluntary contribution 
mechanism with zero contribution (i.e. ig =0) and an individual payoff of 20 
ECUs, is not the Pareto-dominant, welfare-maximizing solution, where 
ig =20 and the individual payoff equals to 32 ECUs. It has been shown 
[Fehr and Gaechter (2000)] that punishment alone can force people to 
cooperate and, though it comes with a cost (i.e. money given to buy 
punishment points and the income loss that punishment implies), it 
eventually leads to an improvement for the society as whole. Counter-
punishment, on the other hand, implies additional costs and is a weapon on 
the hands of the free riders.  One key question to be answered, therefore, is: 
how does the punishment option together with counter-punishment affect 
the average group payoff? Is the group better off now than before?  
  To answer this question we calculate the relative payoff gain of the 
punishment and counter-punishment, which is equal to the difference of the 
average group payoff of between two treatments normalized by the average 
group payoff of the no punishment treatment. In mathematical terms: 
 
VCMpayoffgroupaver
VCMpayoffgroupaverCPPpayoffgroupavergainrelative
...
...&.... −=  
 
Figure 7 depicts the payoff consequences that counter-punishment and 
punishment have over time in both the stranger and partner treatment. As we 
can see, the squander of the endowments in sanctions and counter-sanctions 
leads to a relative payoff loss; in 9 out of 10 periods in the stranger 
treatment and in 6 out of 10 in the partner. 
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Figure 7: Payoff consequences of punishment and counter-punishment 
in the partner and stranger treatment 
 
Under the stranger protocol there is an almost constant convergence 
towards 0, which is the result of the declining number of punishments (see 
figure 9) and of the almost identical contributions between the VCM and the 
P&CP treatment (figure 3). In the partner-treatment, however, where 
punishment is more effective in raising contributions and there are implicit 
opportunities for coordination, relative payoff follows a more turbulent path. 
In the last two periods, in both conditions the relative difference approaches 
zero, which implies that the average payoff in the different treatments is 
approximately identical. This is the result of similar contributions and the 
declining number of sanctions.  
This finding indicates how harmful mutual monitoring can be to a 
society. It also demonstrates that in the presence of counter-punishment, 
where controlling the free riders is harder, participants might be better off 
free riding and avoiding costly confrontations. In combination to the 
previous results it serves as a sign that counter-punishment might lead, 
eventually, to similar outcomes to the treatment where no punishment was 
possible i.e. similar contributions, no punishments and similar payoffs.  
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Result 9: Under both protocols, punishment with counter-punishment leads 
to a relative payoff loss for most of the experiment until the participants 
learn to behave as in the VCM treatment i.e. not contribute and not punish. 
 
4.6 Selfish vs. Altruistic individuals 
The careful reader might have noticed in table 3 differences in the 
contributing behaviour between the different groups. This observation in 
combination to the limited number of counter-sanctions that preclude us 
from a regression analysis behind the counter-punishment driving forces, 
makes a deeper look at the individual actions essential.  
In general, in contrast to the experiments with one-sided punishment 
there seems to be a big variation in individual activities that seems to 
decrease as we approach the end. Under both protocols, the initial 
contributions vary from 0 to 20 ECUs. Most of the subjects appear to 
decrease their contribution over time, whereas some keep it relatively 
constant at either high or low levels of contribution and some appear to be 
undecided about whether to contribute a lot or little. Some individuals 
contribute zero throughout the P&CP treatment21.  
Table 5 summarizes the results from the partner treatment and is 
particularly useful since we can observe how the actions of a participant 
affect the future decisions of the other group members22. It appears that it 
takes only one determined free-rider to bring cooperation down. This cannot 
be better illustrated than in the case of group 6 (participants 21-24), where 3 
participants were strong supporters of cooperation contributing for most of 
the experiment 20 ECUs. Subject 22, who contributed not more than 13 
ECUs at any instance, forced the other three members to drop substantially 
                                                 
21 It is interesting to observe that most of these participants also spend no money on punishment 
activities. 
22 For space economy, the respective table from the stranger treatment is available upon request. 
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their contributions from period 7 onwards. Note that none of the cooperators 
used punishment extensively. The ability of the free riders to obliterate 
cooperation under this set up can also be seen in the cases of group 3 
(subjects 9-12), group 4 (subjects 13-16), and in lesser extent, group 2 
(subjects 5-8).  
Another notable case is group 5: subject 20, a strong reciprocator23, 
spent most of his money in the experiment to sanction the other group 
members. However, his 77 points (!) were not enough to increase 
cooperation within the group. Consequently, by the end of the experiment he 
had also decreased his contribution.  
An enlightening exception to this behaviour is group 1 (subjects 1-
4). All four members were like-minded people whose initial contributions 
did not vary greatly. As a result, though they could not increase cooperation, 
they were able to sustain it at the initial levels. All these are summarized in 
result 10.  
 
Result 10: The level of cooperation, when counter-punishment is allowed, 
depends on whether or not selfish individuals exist: one determined selfish 
individual can obliterate cooperation like in the VCM treatment. 
Cooperation seems possible only between like minded individuals. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In the last years, there has been a considerable amount of papers indicating 
the efficiency of mutual monitoring and sanctioning among the members of 
a group in providing public goods. These papers show that contrary to 
standard economic theory people are willing to punish and under this threat 
contribution levels raise significantly. However, in most cases, we can not 
allow for punishment and exclude counter-punishment. Our hypothesis is 
                                                 
23 A “strong reciprocator” is an individual willing to engage in costly activities, even when they 
yield no future material benefits for him (Herbert Gintis [2000]). 
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that punishment elicits negative emotions amongst the punished, which in 
turn might lead to counter-sanctions.  
  Our results show that when we introduce counter-punishment, 
punishment stops being a valid mechanism for the discipline of selfish 
individuals and the efficient provision of public goods. Under both the 
stranger and the partner protocol, contributions decrease over time and in 
some cases approach full defection.  
The reason behind this behaviour is the decreased willingness of 
cooperators to turn into punishment activities in order to alleviate free 
riding. In this environment, one determined free rider appears to be enough 
to bring down cooperation.  
Mutual monitoring amongst individuals is now a harmful devise 
since it leads to a large squander of resources without any beneficiary result 
until the point where participants actually realise that they can not control 
the free-riders and give up cooperating. In our opinion, this serves as a 
warning that, in many cases, people are unable to achieve cooperation and a 
formal independent body is needed to enforce it. 
The situation might even be understated. We believe that one of the 
characteristics of the individuals who chose to free ride in the real world is 
often their relative “strength” to the cooperators.  In that case, people might 
be even less willing or not willing at all to punish free riders in fear of a 
severe counter-punishment.  
An additional reason, which affects the willingness to punish 
negatively might be the group size; punishment is a second order public 
good, counter-punishment, however, is not. As a result, we believe that the 
greater the group size, the weaker the incentive to punish will be. 
On the other hand, if people are willing to punish cooperators who 
did not punish free-riders this might lead to higher levels of cooperation 
than the ones reported in this paper.  
Our results are mostly related to that of Carpenter (2002) who shows 
that when the price of punishment increases the demand for it decreases. 
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This diminishes the threat of punishment and leads to a raise in free-riding. 
In an indirect way, the threat of counter-punishment increases the price an 
individual has to pay in order to punish. However, in our view, punishment 
comes always at an (expected) high cost since it cannot be separated from 
punishment. 
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A.1 The control treatment  
Figure 8: Average Contribution over time in the treatment with 
one-sided punishment (Stranger) 
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Figure 9 : Average Contribution over time in the treatment with 
one-sided punishment (Partner) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Evolution of the average number of sanctions with one-sided 
punishment (Partner) 
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Figure 11: Evolution of the average number of sanctions with one-sided 
punishment (Stranger) 
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Table 5- PARTNERS  
   Punishments given Punishments received 
Counter-punishments 
given 
Subject  Average contribution Evolution of contribution 
No of 
sanctions Total points 
No of 
sanctions 
Total 
points 
No of 
sanctions 
Total 
points 
1 13.4 11,12,11,15,13,15,15,15,14,13 1 1 4 4 2 3 
2 14.1 13,10,15,15,15,15,16,16,14,12 6 9 1 2 0 0 
3 10.7 10,10,9,11,11,10,12,12,12,10 6 8 8 14 1 1 
4 13.9 14,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,5 3 6 3 4 2 3 
5 3.3 3,10,0,5,0,15,0,0,0,0 2 2 0 0 0 0 
6 4.0 5,10,8,5,2,0,0,0,0,0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
7 2.0 20,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
8 0.0 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
9 7.4 20,20,12,13,1,1,3,4,0,0 2 4 4 12 1 3 
10 8.9 15,10,20,20,15,1,5,1,1,1 3 5 7 17 5 12 
11 5.1 8,9,10,2,12,5,2,1,1,1 10 27 6 9 6 16 
12 9.5 20,20,20,10,10,10,1,3,1,0 2 3 1 2 1 2 
13 7.0 6,8,8,8,0,8,8,8,8,8 8 25 7 14 0 0 
14 9.3 20,10,12,12,12,12,15,0,0,0 4 20 4 10 2 10 
15 9.8 10,11,12,12,12,15,10,11,0,5 8 13 2 4 0 0 
16 2.5 5,12,0,0,8,0,0,0,0,0 4 6 11 34 0 0 
17 5.6 5,7,10,7,5,0,8,8,6,0 1 2 10 25 2 5 
18 0.5 0,0,0,0,1,0,4,0,0,0 1 1 10 46 0 0 
19 9.9 8,10,11,10,10,11,9,10,10,10 0 0 7 9 0 0 
20 11.9 15,14,13,12,11,11,11,11,11,10 25 77 0 0 0 0 
21 14.0 20,20,20,20,10,20,20,10,0,0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
22 7.3 10,5,10,8,7,9,13,0,10,1 3 3 1 2 1 4 
23 14.7 20,20,20,20,20,10,20,10,7,0 1 2 1 1 1 2 
24 17.0 20,20,20,20,20,20,20,20,10,0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Subjects 1-12 took part in session 3 and subjects 13-24 in the session 4. Subjects 1-4 formed group 1, 5-8 group 2 etc.   
Contributions refer to the P&CP treatment.       
 
